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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Daniel Farber’s contribution to this Symposium suggests that 
some aspects of constitutional jurisprudence can be best understood 
by treating constitutional rights as default rules.1 Specifically, he at-
tempts to use the concept of default rules to clarify the hopelessly 
confused doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.2 Professor Farber’s 
starting point is incontestable. Virtually everyone agrees that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a mess. To borrow Farber’s 
description, the doctrine is a quagmire: there is no generally accepted 
explanation for how the doctrine is supposed to work, what limits ex-
ist on the application of the doctrine, or even what purpose it is sup-
posed to serve.3 Various prominent academic commentators have of-
fered different suggestions to clarify these issues,4 but these com-
                                                                                                                      
 * David and Deborah Fonveille and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law, 
Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 913-15. 
 3. Id. at 926-29. 
 4. Farber surveys the wide range of academic discussions of this subject, but a rep-
resentative sample of the varying approaches can be gleaned from just three of the most 
important sources. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1988) (focusing on the disparate bargaining power of government and individuals as the 
key to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (arguing that preventing political favoritism is 
the central purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Re-
954  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:953 
 
mentaries explain the doctrine in very different ways and tend to 
propose different (and even inconsistent) solutions to reconcile the 
problems posed by the doctrine.  
 Farber’s alternative explanation of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine initially seems like an attractive alternative to other promi-
nent explanations of the phenomenon. In particular, Farber’s explana-
tion seems to account for the malleability of virtually all examples of 
unconstitutional conditions. As Farber notes, courts seem willing to 
override almost all supposedly unconstitutional conditions in some cir-
cumstances and often permit those who possess the underlying rights 
to waive the rights altogether.5 Contrary to the implications of abso-
lute protection conveyed by the doctrine’s title, the rights protected by 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine are themselves merely condi-
tional.  The fact that the rights holders can forgo the protection of 
these rights leads Farber to conclude that “rights” are, in fact, little 
more than default rules, which come into play only when the two par-
ties (here, the government and the rights holder) have failed to come 
to a voluntary agreement about some contested matter.6 
 Although at first glance this description of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine (and of constitutional rights in general) seems to 
explain a great deal of what goes on in constitutional adjudication, 
upon closer examination this approach fails to capture the essence of 
rights—that is, it fails to capture the essence of the constitutionally 
mandated relationship between individual citizens and their gov-
ernment. Three reasons support this conclusion. First, I believe Far-
ber overestimates the extent to which the courts have allowed rights 
to be alienable. Many—perhaps most—rights cannot be bargained 
away or abandoned by the rights holder. Second, even the rights that 
at first blush seem to be alienable may not really involve that phe-
nomenon at all. For example, even if a rights holder has decided not 
to exercise a particular right, that right nevertheless has already 
served its purpose by framing the negotiation between the rights 
holder and the government.  
 Third, and most importantly, the notion that an individual rights 
holder can bargain away his or her rights fundamentally miscon-
strues the structural nature of constitutional rights in our system of 
limited government. In the American constitutional system, a consti-
tutional right is only partly intended to benefit the person who im-
mediately exercises that right. The other, equally important function 
of rights is to structure the government’s relationship with the entire 
                                                                                                                      
ligion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) (arguing that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine should be abandoned altogether). 
 5. Farber, supra note 1, at 917.  
 6. Id. at  914.  
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citizenry—including those who have no immediate intention of exer-
cising the rights in question. The private contractual model of consti-
tutional rights is incompatible with the structural function of those 
rights because the contractual model would permit the government 
essentially to contract for additional power without going through 
the only defined legal process—that is, amending the Constitution—
by which the government’s power legitimately may be enhanced. 
These problems are magnified when one takes into account the dis-
parity of bargaining power in negotiations between the government 
and vulnerable rights holders.  
 Parts II and III question the extent to which rights are typically 
alienable and discuss the various examples Farber provides to sup-
port his thesis. Part IV turns to the case against the alienability of 
rights, focusing in particular on the structural function of rights. 
II.   ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ROUTINELY ALIENABLE? 
 The first cavil I have with Farber’s analysis is his presumption that 
alienability is the rule rather than the exception in the realm of consti-
tutional rights. There is good reason to believe this is not true. It is not 
difficult to assemble a list of constitutional rights that are not only in-
alienable, but which would have very little meaning if they were made 
subject to bargaining between rights holders and the government. 
 Consider first the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery 
and involuntary servitude.7 If constitutional rights were routinely 
subject to contract-style bargaining, then the ban on slavery and in-
voluntary servitude would have no substance. Of course, slavery it-
self is not subject to the contractual model because a slave is bound 
over to his or her “owner” without receiving any benefit in exchange. 
But it is not difficult to conceive of forms of enslavement that fall 
within the Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription and are, in fact, 
models of the contracting away of constitutional rights and liberties. 
We do not have to speculate about such cases because the Supreme 
Court’s Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence already provides us 
with an example in the peonage cases decided in the early years of 
the twentieth century. In Bailey v. Alabama,8 the Court struck down 
an Alabama criminal statute that was used to enforce contracts for 
labor. According to the Court,  
If the statute in this case had authorized the employing company 
to seize the debtor and hold him to the service until he paid the fif-
teen dollars, or had furnished the equivalent in labor, its invalidity 
would not be questioned. It would be equally clear that the State 
                                                                                                                      
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.   
 8. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
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could not authorize its constabulary to prevent the servant from 
escaping and to force him to work out his debt.9  
The fact that the consent to the labor contract may have been freely 
given did not matter—the debtor could not bargain away his right to 
be free of indentured servitude. 
 In other constitutional areas the Court has not provided such a 
clear-cut renunciation of bargaining, but it is not difficult to extrapo-
late such an absolute inalienability rule from the Court’s jurispru-
dence in these areas. In the Eighth Amendment area, for example, 
the Court has repeatedly emphasized that certain forms of punish-
ment fall outside the scope of anything the government can impose, 
without regard to the desires of the rights holder. The death penalty, 
for example, may be constitutionally imposed only upon someone who 
commits an intentional crime that results in the death of a victim or 
victims. Specifically, the death penalty may no longer be imposed for 
the crime of rape because to do so would violate the proportionality 
mandate of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment 
provision.10 The Court’s absolutist phrasing of the right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishments could not be overridden by a 
contractual deal between a state and a prisoner convicted of rape 
who would prefer death to the (constitutionally permissible) punish-
ment of life imprisonment. Along the same lines, the state could not 
circumvent the Court’s Eighth Amendment prison conditions rulings 
by bargaining with prisoners to consent to imprisonment in a facility 
whose conditions fell short of the Eighth Amendment minimum, in 
exchange for a shorter term of imprisonment.  
 Even the most conservative Justices on Eighth Amendment mat-
ters presumably would not subject to bargaining the relatively few 
rights they recognize within the Eighth Amendment. Justice Tho-
mas, for example, has expressed the view that the Eighth Amend-
ment limits only the legislature’s ability to incorporate excessively 
severe punishments into a criminal statute.11 It is hard to conceive 
how Justice Thomas could prohibit the government from imposing a 
particular level of punishment for a crime as a general matter but, 
then in individual cases, permit the government to use its bargaining 
power to negotiate exactly the same unconstitutionally severe pun-
ishment for the same crime.  
                                                                                                                      
 9. Id. at 244. 
 10. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
the imposition of a death sentence for the crime of rape would be grossly disproportionate 
and cruel, in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 11. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38-40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Eighth Amendment limits only punishments imposed under statutory provisions by 
juries and judges and does not apply to post-adjudication harms suffered by prisoners). 
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 The right to vote is another example of a logically inalienable 
right.12 We know that the government cannot impose a poll tax as a 
condition on exercising the right to vote.13 Could those who control 
the government avoid this restriction on the authority to manipulate 
the composition of voting lists based on wealth by simply offering all 
those who agree not to vote a check for five hundred dollars? Such a 
program would undermine the principle of an independent and uni-
versal electorate to exactly the same extent as the poll tax regimes of 
the segregation era, and the Court would almost certainly treat this 
scheme as equally impermissible—regardless of the extent to which 
some potential voters might sincerely want to enter into the bargain 
and obtain remuneration for the apathy that many of them routinely 
demonstrate for free. 
 A fourth example of inalienability involves privacy rights. The 
modern era in constitutional privacy protection began with a case in 
which the Supreme Court noted the dangers inherent in allowing the 
state to determine who can procreate and who cannot.14 “The power 
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastat-
ing effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which 
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”15 In 
several cases in recent years, prosecutors adjudicating criminal cases 
involving sex crimes have occasionally offered offenders the option of 
taking a shorter prison sentence in exchange for undergoing surgical 
treatments that inhibit or exterminate the offender’s right to procre-
ate.16 The dangers of allowing the state to regulate these matters are 
hardly mitigated when a criminal defendant consents to give up the 
right to procreate in order to avoid the application of the state’s 
criminal punishment authority.17  
 But the potential threat the concept of rights bargaining poses to 
procreative and similar privacy rights does not end with the imposi-
tion of punishments for sexual offenses. It could easily extend as well 
to the area of social welfare benefits. In one case, for example, a fed-
eral district court described how “an indefinite number of poor people 
have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation 
under the threat that various federally supported welfare benefits 
would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible steriliza-
                                                                                                                      
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.   
 13. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
 14. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 15. Id. at 541. 
 16. For a description of one such case, see Tamar Lewin, Texas Court Agrees to Cas-
tration for Rapist of 13-Year-Old Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1992, at A1. 
 17. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth 
Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615 (2000) 
(discussing the various reasons why the government should not be allowed to impose un-
constitutional punishments through plea bargaining). 
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tion.”18 The modern legal culture’s embarrassment over such pre-
modern legal artifacts as Buck v. Bell19 is such that few if any judges 
today are likely to uphold an official program permitting a recipient 
to bargain away her uterus for marginally greater welfare benefits. 
 One of Farber’s most prominent examples of alienable rights in-
volves the First Amendment right of free speech.20 I will address his 
specific example of government employee speech below,21 but for pre-
sent purposes, it is worth noting that there are large swaths of First 
Amendment free speech jurisprudence in which the concept of 
alienability would be anathematic. Political speech is an obvious 
starting point. Consider a hypothetical statute analogous to the vot-
ing rights measure cited above. Could the government pass a general 
statute offering all citizens five hundred dollars if they gave up for a 
given period of time their right to speak out publicly on a certain is-
sue? Likewise, could the government formalize a system that pro-
vided favorable treatment (for example, expedited licensing approv-
als) for applicants who publicly express support for the government’s 
policies (by signing a petition supporting a public referendum favored 
by the government, for example)? Under a pure bargaining model, 
these mechanisms for purchasing the opposition’s silence would be 
permissible. Allowing the government to use its authority to bargain 
for the silence of speakers (especially speakers who may not have 
sufficient financial resources to resist the bargain) would effectively 
undermine the First Amendment’s crucial role in preventing the gov-
ernment from distorting the marketplace of ideas.22  
 Public forums present related constraints on the government’s 
ability to bargain for a reduction in a speaker’s free speech rights. It 
is boilerplate First Amendment doctrine that the government may 
not exclude all speech from a traditional public forum such as a park 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 19. 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (upholding an order permitting the sterilization of a 
“feeble-minded white woman” living in a state hospital, on the ground that “[i]t is better for 
all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them 
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continu-
ing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”). 
 20. See Farber, supra note 1, at 920-23. 
 21. See infra notes 27-58 and accompanying text. 
 22. For an excellent discussion of the necessary limits of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in the area of government subsidized speech, see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 675 (1992). Professor Cole proposes a “spheres of neutrality” approach analyzing gov-
ernment attempts to regulate subsidized speech. Under this approach, certain institutions, 
such as public universities, public forums, and the press, are protected from government 
regulation even if they receive government subsidies because First Amendment doctrine “re-
flects an implicit commitment to enforcing spheres of independence and neutrality in institu-
tional contexts where governmental content control would undermine public debate, and 
where neutrality is consistent with the purpose of the institution.” Id. at 683. 
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or a sidewalk and may only limit speech based on content if the gov-
ernment can show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compel-
ling interest.23 The rules governing designated public forums are 
more flexible, but even in a designated limited public forum, the gov-
ernment may not engage in viewpoint discrimination24 and may not 
close the forum in response to speech that the government does not 
favor.25 These rules are absolute and nonnegotiable. The government 
cannot say to any speaker “you may use our public forum, but only if 
you speak out in favor of the government,” nor may the government 
exercise the usual rights of contracting parties to decline to rent its 
property to speakers with whom the government disagrees.26  
 These are merely a sample of what could be a very long list of pro-
posals to permit the bargaining away of rights, none of which would 
be likely to gain the support of even a very conservative and rights-
hostile Supreme Court. Other examples might include a government 
promise of subsidized student loans for individuals agreeing to at-
tend government-approved churches four times a month; govern-
ment-subsidized mortgages for homeowners willing to sign away in 
advance any claim of a Fourth Amendment right to be free of war-
rantless searches; and a welfare program that promises greater bene-
fits to recipients who give up in advance any right to a trial if they 
are subsequently charged with a violent crime.  
 In short, there is ample cause to doubt Farber’s central proposi-
tion that the courts frequently permit rights to be bargained away. 
Farber does give some examples, however, of major areas of constitu-
tional law in which the courts do seem to routinely permit bargaining 
over the scope of rights. Upon closer examination, however, these ex-
amples do not necessarily support the thesis that rights may rou-
tinely be bargained away. Some of Farber’s examples do not involve 
rights at all; some of them do not really involve bargaining; and some 
of them involve bargaining under the large, dark shadow of a com-
prehensive body of rights. At the very least, even when a rights 
holder decides not to exercise his or her rights, the existence of the 
rights nevertheless dictates the relationship between the rights 
holder and the government.  
                                                                                                                      
 23. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 24. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(describing the constitutional rule “forbidding the State [from exercising] viewpoint dis-
crimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation”). 
 25. See Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 (1st Cir. 
1989) (“Once the state has created a forum, it may not condition access to the forum on the 
content of the message to be communicated, or close the forum solely because it disagrees 
with the messages being communicated in it.”). 
 26. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that the city of 
Chattanooga violated the First Amendment when it refused to rent a municipal audito-
rium for a production of the rock musical, Hair). 
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III.   THE INERADICABLE RESIDUE OF RIGHTS 
 In the face of multiple instances in which the government is de-
nied the authority to bargain away the rights of rights holders, Far-
ber offers four examples of constitutional rights that are routinely 
the subject of bargaining. These examples include conditional subsi-
dies, plea bargaining, conditions on the use of property, and state 
sovereignty. Once more, at first glance Farber seems to state a strong 
case; in each of these areas government bargaining is common, and 
rights holders routinely seem to give up their rights in exchange for 
some government benefit. Upon closer examination, however, these 
are all imperfect examples of the rights bargaining thesis.  
A.   Conditional Subsidies and the Problem of Government 
Employment 
 The government employee and subsidized social services cases 
present an obvious counterexample to the broad claim that the gov-
ernment generally may not attempt to purchase rights from its citi-
zens. In the First Amendment context, Farber uses these cases to re-
but the routine assumption that the government generally is not 
permitted to purchase the silence of its critics. Farber’s claim, in con-
trast to the routine assumptions about inalienable free speech rights, 
identifies the category of First Amendment precedents involving gov-
ernment subsidies as a “dramatic illustration of the government’s 
ability to obtain opt-outs from constitutional rights in return for fi-
nancial benefits.”27 
 Much of what Farber says about bargaining in the First Amend-
ment context rests heavily on precedents involving government em-
ployees and government contractors. But (as Farber carefully ac-
knowledges) the government contract and government employee 
cases do not provide clear-cut support for Farber’s position.28 First of 
all, these cases are not at all consistent. On one hand, as Farber 
notes, the Court seems to have broadly endorsed bargaining in Rust 
v. Sullivan,29 in which the Court upheld a very broad regulation de-
nying federal funds to any person or organization that lobbied, en-
dorsed, or facilitated abortion, or that was even within the same cor-
porate structure as someone who lobbied, endorsed, or facilitated 
abortion. The Court’s opinion upholding this regulation is very ex-
pansive and seems to acknowledge no exceptions. As Farber summa-
rizes the Court’s perspective on the clinic workers’ First Amendment 
                                                                                                                      
 27. Farber, supra note 1, at 924. 
 28. Id. at 920-24. 
 29. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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claims in Rust, “[i]n return for government funding, they gave up the 
right to communicate freely and candidly with their patients.”30 
 The problem with this interpretation of Rust is that the Court 
never aggressively pursued the most restrictive implications of Rust 
and started limiting the scope of the Rust principle almost as soon as 
its Rust opinion was issued. Four years after Rust in Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,31 the Supreme Court 
rejected the University of Virginia’s attempt to use Rust to justify its 
limitations on access to student activity funds. The Court distin-
guished Rust on the grounds that in that case “the government did 
not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used 
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its 
own program.”32 According to the Court, when the government cre-
ates and finances a program to encourage private speech (as in 
Rosenberger), the program is governed by all the normal First 
Amendment restrictions, which cannot be purchased by the govern-
ment with program funds.33  
 In two subsequent government funding cases, the Court inter-
preted the applicable statutes very narrowly to avoid a conflict be-
tween the government’s funding decisions and the First Amendment. 
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,34 for example, the 
Court upheld an amendment to the appropriations bill for the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts. The amendment required the En-
dowment to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency 
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” 
when making grants.35 The Court held that this did not violate the 
First Amendment because the Court interpreted the provision in 
such a way that it “merely adds some imprecise considerations to an 
already subjective selection process.”36 Thus, the provision survived 
First Amendment scrutiny only because the Court effectively robbed 
it of any substantive effect. As Justice Scalia noted snidely in object-
ing to the majority’s evisceration of the statute, “ ‘The operation was 
a success, but the patient died.’ ”37  
 Similarly, in United States v. American Library Association,38 the 
Court upheld the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which 
required libraries accepting federal funds to use Internet filters on 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Farber, supra note 1, at 924. 
 31. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 32. Id. at 833. 
 33. Id. at 834. 
 34. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 35. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000). 
 36. Finley, 524 U.S. at 590. 
 37. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 38. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
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publicly accessible computers.39 Farber cites the part of the Court’s 
opinion in which the plurality relied “squarely on Rust” to permit the 
government to condition its funding on the recipients giving up their 
First Amendment rights.40 But, in fact, a majority of the Court did 
not endorse this proposition. Three Justices would have held CIPA 
unconstitutional.41 Two other Justices concurred in the plurality’s 
judgment that CIPA was constitutional, but did not even mention 
Rust, and based their decision on the fact that the statute allowed 
adult patrons to request that the filter be disabled.42 As Justice Ken-
nedy noted, “there is little to this case”43 given the fact that the stat-
ute itself gave patrons the ability to access the entire Internet, thus 
removing the claim that the government was requiring censorship of 
protected material.  
 Most significantly, however, in the most recent case in which the 
Court actually considered the claim that the government may require 
those receiving government subsidies to give up their First Amend-
ment rights, the Court has definitively rejected the entire concept. In 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,44 the Supreme Court struck down 
a statute imposing restrictions on the kinds of claims government-
financed lawyers could raise in court. The government defended the 
limitations by arguing that they were indistinguishable from the re-
strictions imposed on clinic workers in Rust.45 The Court rejected the 
analogy, holding that Rust applied only to instances in which the 
government was hiring speakers to speak on the government’s be-
half.46 “The lawyer,” on the other hand, “is not the government’s 
speaker.”47 Thus, after Velazquez, the government may require 
speakers to give up their First Amendment rights as a condition of 
accepting government money only in situations in which the speaker 
is literally being hired to read the government’s script. 
 Whether this interpretation is consistent with the facts of Rust is 
highly dubious. The regulations at issue in Rust, after all, applied to 
medical professionals, including doctors, whose professional respon-
sibility would preclude them from subordinating their patients’ in-
terest in full information to the government’s ideological opposition 
to some of that information. Based on the most recent cases in this 
area, therefore, one could plausibly conclude (as Justice Scalia did in 
                                                                                                                      
 39. See Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335. 
 40. See Farber, supra note 1, at 928. 
 41. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg). 
 42. See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 215 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 44. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 45. Id. at 540. 
 46. Id. at 541. 
 47. Id. at 542. 
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Velazquez48) that the Court has now either abandoned Rust alto-
gether or carved out an intellectually indefensible exception for gov-
ernment-subsidized lawyers. At the very least, it is clear that in 
every single opinion after Rust the Court hedged on its application, 
carved out broad exceptions to it, and finally defined its scope in a 
way that seems to undercut its very holding. Rust—or at least the 
broad implication that the government may systematically require 
recipients of government funds to give up rights in order to obtain 
the funds—is no longer valid. 
 The other cases Farber cites involving limits on government sub-
sidized speech all involve limitations imposed on government em-
ployees. Farber cites these cases for the proposition that “the gov-
ernment [may] restrict [First Amendment] rights in exchange for 
providing benefits.”49 It is certainly true that the Court has given 
government employers substantial leeway in restricting the speech of 
government employees. Farber focuses on the underlying spirit of 
these decisions as it was once articulated by Justice Holmes: A po-
liceman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”50 The problem with this 
approach, however, is that the Court has never come close to adopt-
ing as a general rule Justice Holmes’s draconian no-rights approach 
to government employee speech.51 Indeed, the Court has asserted 
flatly that this position has been “uniformly rejected.”52  
 In Pickering v. Board of Education,53 the Court provided explicit 
protection of public employee speech: “[S]tatements by public officials 
on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment pro-
tection despite the fact that the statements are directed at their 
nominal superiors.”54 In subsequent cases, the Court has introduced 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Id. at 552-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (considering and rejecting each of the Court’s 
attempts to distinguish Rust from Velazquez).  
 49. Farber, supra note 1, at 920. 
 50. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 51. The Court also rejected Holmes’s no-rights notion in another government subsi-
dized speech context: the public forum cases. Holmes’s view was that members of the pub-
lic had no First Amendment rights to speak on government-owned property such as public 
parks. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, 167 U.S. 43, 47 
(Mass. 1897) (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a 
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public 
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”). The Court rejected this no-
rights position from the inception of the public forum doctrine in the 1930s. See Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks 
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out 
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions.”). 
 52. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
 53. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 54. Id. at 574. 
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complications into the government employee free-speech equation by 
permitting government employers to sanction employee speech that 
is not on a matter of public concern or which disrupts the work-
place.55 In other cases, the Court has expressed its willingness to de-
fer broadly to the employer’s perceptions of disruption.56 But the 
Court has continued to emphasize that the government cannot force 
employees to forgo their constitutional right to speak out on matters 
of public concern as a condition of taking the government’s offer of 
employment, nor can the government offer nonpolitical jobs only to 
those who agree to adopt a particular political affiliation.57  
 When these cases are considered as a whole, the underlying prin-
ciple is far narrower than Farber suggests. Indeed, these cases may 
not represent bargaining over rights at all. These cases do not, as 
Farber argues, stand for the broad proposition that the government 
can condition employment on speech restrictions. Rather, these cases 
represent the much more limited proposition that the government 
can require its employees to do their jobs. The only restrictions on 
speech permitted by the courts are restrictions on speech that inter-
fere with the job. At least as a conceptual matter, this is no more an 
interference with the employee’s speech rights than the requirement 
that a government employee actually stay at his or her post for the 
full workday is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection 
against indentured servitude. The employee is not bargaining away 
his or her free speech right by agreeing not to disrupt the work-
place—even if the disruption takes the form of speech. It is true that 
some of the cases may have interpreted the concept of “disruption” 
very broadly and deferred too easily to employer perceptions in iden-
tifying workplace disruption,58 but the underlying principle that a 
government employee is expected to do his or her job is neither in-
compatible with the First Amendment nor supportive of the rights 
bargaining theory.  
 The other cases Farber cites as examples of conditional subsidies 
involve the Court’s refusal to require the government to finance abor-
tion in programs funding a broad range of other medical procedures. 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression 
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, 
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”). 
 56. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (deferring broadly to public em-
ployer’s factual assumptions about what employees have said).  
 57. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990) (holding that civil servant 
public employee jobs may not be conditioned on political affiliation or support). 
 58. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (“[W]e have given substantial weight to government 
employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a 
matter of public concern, and even though when the government is acting as sovereign our 
review of legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential.”). 
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In these cases the Court has upheld programs under which the gov-
ernment has refused to include both nontherapeutic59 and therapeu-
tic abortions60 in the list of procedures financed under government-
funded Medicaid statutes. Again, Farber reads these cases as sup-
porting the proposition that the government can bargain away Medi-
caid participants’ right to have an abortion in exchange for receiving 
the government subsidy. According to Farber, these cases stand for 
the proposition that “the government can provide benefits for women 
who choose not to exercise the right, thereby purchasing their waiver 
of the right to an abortion.”61 A more plausible reading of these cases 
is the rationale the Court itself provides: “It simply does not follow 
that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional enti-
tlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of 
protected choices.”62 There are obvious problems with the Court’s ra-
tionale, in that it allows the “Legislative Branch to impose the politi-
cal majority’s judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desir-
able preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the Consti-
tution entrusts to the individual.”63 But neither the Court’s own ex-
planation of its behavior nor the criticism of the Court’s approach has 
anything to do with the legitimacy of bargaining for rights; rather, it 
has to do with the fact that the Court refuses to prohibit the govern-
ment from excluding the one procedure that happens also to be a 
fundamental right from a funding program that covers a range of dif-
ferent procedures.  
 The abortion funding cases are not good examples of rights bar-
gaining because there is no bargain. Poor women who are pregnant 
get nothing from the government for having a child. The government 
gets what it wants not by bargaining with the woman, but rather by 
refusing to bargain, or in any other way getting involved with the 
woman. The only way the abortion funding cases could be construed 
as rights bargaining cases would be if the government was attempt-
ing to use general public benefits to bribe the woman into having a 
child (or not having a child). At least one district court has seen such 
a case, and the court specifically rejected any claim that the govern-
ment has the authority to offer government aid recipients a money-
for-rights bargain.64 
                                                                                                                      
 59. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 60. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 61. Farber, supra note 1, at 923. 
 62. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. 
 63. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 64. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding unconstitutional efforts to coerce aid recipients to submit to ster-
ilization in return for greater government benefits). 
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 In sum, the most obvious examples of the bargaining-for-rights the-
sis in fact are not bargaining cases at all, or are bargaining cases only 
in very limited senses of the term. The other three broad categories of 
cases Farber cites provide even less support for the bargaining thesis. 
B.   Plea Bargaining 
 In addition to the government subsidy cases, plea bargaining 
seems like another obvious example of a situation in which the gov-
ernment explicitly offers something of value in exchange for someone 
giving up constitutional rights. Farber’s description of the plea bar-
gaining process initially seems to be an unobjectionable assessment 
of the situation: “The Bill of Rights provides elaborate protections for 
potential criminal defendants. . . . As it turns out, all of these rights 
can be bartered away—and they usually are.”65 The obvious reality, 
as Farber points out, is that most criminal cases are resolved by plea 
bargaining rather than a full-fledged trial on the merits of the in-
dictment, which would ordinarily involve an aggressive attempt by 
the defense to exercise the full panoply of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment rights.  
 My disagreement with Farber is not with his rendition of the facts 
of the criminal adjudication process, but rather with the question 
whether the reality of pervasive plea bargaining really supports the 
rights bargaining thesis. I think it does not; because in the over-
whelming number of cases, the focal point of the plea bargaining 
process is not the exercise of constitutional criminal procedure rights, 
but rather the more basic fact (in most criminal cases) of certain 
guilt. The fact is that most criminal defendants who eventually plead 
guilty to a criminal charge actually committed the crime, in most 
cases the government can prove the defendant’s guilt, and in most 
cases none of the constitutional rights applicable to criminal trials 
could be exercised in a way that would make the slightest difference 
to the ultimate adjudication of guilt. When a criminal defendant ac-
cepts a plea bargain, therefore, he or she is agreeing to waive the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right that probably would not have mat-
tered anyway.  
 If a criminal defendant accepts a plea bargain in a context in 
which the exercise of a constitutional right might have made a differ-
ence (in the sense that it might have led to the exclusion of important 
evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment or a confes-
sion obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment), then presumably 
the plea accepted by the defendant will reflect the rights involved. 
That is, the government will have offered the defendant a better deal 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Farber, supra note 1, at 924. 
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than the defendant would have gotten in the absence of the constitu-
tional violation. The acceptance of the plea bargain is not, however, 
evidence of the defendant “bartering away” his or her rights; rather, 
it is an example of a defendant recognizing that the exercise of the 
constitutional rights might not have been sufficient to undermine 
other clear evidence of his or her guilt. If anything, this scenario is 
an example of the government bartering away its authority to prose-
cute the defendant for a more serious crime or impose on the defen-
dant a harsher sentence—in recognition of the fact that its agents 
violated the defendant’s rights and therefore cast into some doubt the 
government’s ability to convict the defendant of any crime. The point 
is: the rights involved did not disappear or become irrelevant; if the 
government violated the defendant’s constitutional rights in a sig-
nificant way, then the rights were at the forefront of everyone’s 
minds during the plea bargaining process.  
 In sum, even though a plea bargain appears to fit precisely the con-
tract model of relating the right holder and the government, in fact a 
plea bargain occurs only after the constitutional rights in question 
have already served their function of structuring the government’s ac-
tion toward the individual defendant. In preparing the case that leads 
to the plea bargain, constitutional rules will dictate virtually every as-
pect of the government’s behavior, in ways that the government can-
not avoid through bargaining. The government’s entire preparation of 
its case will be dictated by Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rules, 
and the bargain that is offered to the defendant will reflect these rules. 
These rules are not really bargained away, because the plea bargain 
will only occur after the defendant’s lawyer is assured that the gov-
ernment has a sufficient quantum of legally obtained evidence to make 
a guilty verdict at trial a serious possibility.  
C.   Conditions on the Use of Property 
 Farber’s third example of the rights bargaining thesis involves 
bargains between property owners and the government over restric-
tions on property that the government would not be allowed to im-
pose in the absence of a bargain. On its face, this is the example cited 
by Farber that seems to fit the rights bargaining thesis best. There 
are several characteristics of this category of cases, however, which 
make it difficult to extrapolate from the property cases any general 
principle regarding rights bargaining that could be applied directly 
to other areas of constitutional law. 
 The first distinctive characteristic of the property cases is the na-
ture of the thing being negotiated. In contrast to Farber’s other 
rights bargaining examples, the property rights cases involve a proc-
ess in which the government and the rights holder are negotiating 
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over similar matters having similar characteristics. In the property 
cases, both the government and the rights holder are negotiating 
over a single, concrete item: the piece of property. In the cases re-
ferred to by Farber, the rights holder wants to use the piece of prop-
erty in question one way, and the government wants exactly the 
same piece of property used another way. This is significant because 
both the rights holder and the government are negotiating with iden-
tical measures of value. A restriction on a piece of property can be 
quantified fairly easily, and both the rights holder and the govern-
ment will have access to the same valuations. Determining that a 
limitation on a particular parcel of property will devalue that prop-
erty by one million dollars will have the effect of focusing very closely 
the negotiation between the government and the rights holder.  
 By contrast, in the other examples of rights bargaining cited by 
Farber, the things supposedly being bartered will have very different 
measures of value, if indeed they could be calculated or compared at 
all. The value of a government job, for example, could be valued 
based on the annual salary attached to that job; but what would be 
the value to the job applicant of giving up his or her First Amend-
ment right of free speech? The comparative valuation problem be-
comes infinitely more complicated when adding into the equation the 
social costs of abridging the free speech rights of government em-
ployees.66 Thus, one reason for permitting property owners to bargain 
away their rights under the Takings Clause may be that the nature 
of the bargain is such that in property rights cases the rights holder 
will be more likely to understand what he or she is giving up (and 
therefore what he or she should demand in exchange from the gov-
ernment for giving up the right) than in cases dealing with other 
types of rights. 
 The second distinctive characteristic of the property cases is the 
nature of the constitutional right involved in the bargain. In cases 
dealing with free speech or constitutional criminal procedure rights, 
the rights involved are by their nature less flexible and more defini-
tive than property rights. In First Amendment cases, for example, 
the government is prohibited altogether from engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination and virtually always prohibited from engaging in con-
tent discrimination. “Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious 
form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opin-
ion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”67 
                                                                                                                      
 66. With regard to the social value of individual rights, see infra notes 97-110 and ac-
companying text. 
 67. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
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These rules are inflexible and strictly confine the extent to which the 
government can regulate speech.  
 In contrast to the strict rules regarding government regulation of 
speech, the rules regarding government regulation of property under 
the Takings Clause are comparatively flexible and lenient. As a rou-
tine matter, the government can engage in all sorts of regulation that 
falls short of a physical taking of the property,68 or a permanent dep-
rivation of all beneficial use of a parcel of property,69 and the Su-
preme Court has expressed little inclination to second-guess the gov-
ernment’s purposes for property regulation.70   
 The final distinctive characteristic of the property cases is the 
identity of the parties who typically participate in a negotiation be-
tween the government and the property owner. In the two other ma-
jor areas of individual rights cited as examples by Farber, there are 
usually major disparities in bargaining power between the individual 
rights holders and the government. Moreover, in other constitutional 
areas, there is nothing comparable to the Takings Clause “just com-
pensation” requirement. In the takings context, the relevant consti-
tutional provision itself71 expressly permits the thing in question (the 
property) to be “purchased” by the state in exchange for “just” pay-
ment. Thus, in other areas of constitutional law a “bargain” between 
the government and an individual may result in grossly disparate 
relative outcomes. In a dispute between the government and a job 
applicant for a government job, or a contest between a criminal de-
fendant and the state apparatus of criminal investigation and prose-
cution, the rights holders are at a distinct disadvantage in both re-
sources and information, and the government is under no obligation 
                                                                                                                      
 68. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). 
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinc-
tion between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language re-
quires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires pri-
vate property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a 
condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution 
contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner 
from making certain uses of her private property. Our jurisprudence involving 
condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most 
part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory 
takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is character-
ized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” designed to allow “careful exami-
nation and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” 
Id. at 321-22 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 69. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (taking of property 
categorically found “where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use 
of land”). 
 70. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (broadly deferring to gov-
ernment’s rationale when determining whether the exercise of eminent domain authority 
satisfies the Takings Clause “public use” requirement). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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to reach a result that gives the individual a “just” exchange for what-
ever benefit the government obtains as a result of the bargain. For 
this reason, bargaining over rights is inherently more problematic 
outside the Takings Clause context. 
 In disputes over the uses of property, on the other hand, the gov-
ernment and the rights holders often are both well financed and have 
equivalent incentives to pursue their interests aggressively. Even in 
situations in which the government seeks to obtain the property of 
relatively less powerful individuals—as in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don72—the government ultimately may take the property only in ex-
change for paying the owner a “just” price. In sum, no bargaining oc-
curs in most regulatory takings cases because the property owner 
cannot prevent the government from regulating the property, as long 
as the property retains some value. If the property is robbed of all 
value by a regulation, or if the property is physically taken, then no 
bargaining occurs because the government has no choice but to pay 
“just” compensation.  
 The cases cited by Farber as evidence of bargaining involve the 
relatively rare situations in which the Takings Clause has prohibited 
the government from regulating a particular piece of property, but 
the government effectively enforces the regulation anyway by negoti-
ating a deal under which the property owner consents to the regula-
tion in exchange for some other benefit from the government. The 
crucial cases illustrating this scenario are Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission73 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.74 Although these 
cases appear to present straightforward examples of rights bargain-
ing, the key to these cases is the limits the Court places on the gov-
ernment’s ability to enter into the bargain with the property owners. 
In these cases the Court held that two limits apply to government ef-
forts to exchange benefits for regulatory concessions by property 
owners: first, there must be a “substantial” nexus between the nature 
of the property regulation that the government seeks to enforce and 
the benefit offered to the property owner in exchange for agreeing to 
the regulation;75 and second, the value of the benefit must be propor-
tional to the value of the regulation.76 In Nollan, the Court applied 
these limits to strike down an attempt by the California Coastal 
Commission to extract a public-access easement from a property 
owner in exchange for granting a permit to build a new house.77 In 
                                                                                                                      
 72. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 73. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 74. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 75. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 76. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395 (the value of the benefit must be related “both in na-
ture and extent” to the value of the regulation). 
 77. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
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Dolan, the Court applied these limits to prohibit a city planning 
commission from requiring a landowner to dedicate part of her land 
to a public greenway and bicycle path in exchange for a permit to ex-
pand her store and pave her parking lot.78 
 Farber objects to both of the limits the Court announced in Nollan 
and Dolan because, among other things, the limits undermine the 
bargain that the parties want to engage in.79 In the first place, the 
description is not accurate, given the fact that only one party in these 
cases really wanted to bargain at all. But even if this description 
were accurate, the fact that the limits undercut the bargain is ex-
actly the point. The fact that the Court imposes such rigid restric-
tions on these bargains indicates the Court’s deep skepticism about 
the entire concept of rights bargaining—even in an area in which the 
bargaining thesis would presumably be most apt. Farber himself 
provides an explanation for the Court’s skepticism (in this area and 
others): “Rights holders may sometimes make excessive concessions 
to the government [thereby allowing their rights to be purchased too 
cheaply] . . . because certain rights have positive externalities, and 
the rights holder will not take these benefits into account when nego-
tiating.”80 These externalities are part of the structural function of 
rights, the preservation of which is one of the main reasons for reject-
ing the general notion that rights may be bargained away by the 
government.81 
 If the constrained bargaining that occurs in this small category of 
property cases provides any support for Farber’s rights bargaining 
thesis, it is only in the very limited circumstances defined by the 
facts of the cases. The Nollan/Dolan cases do not even represent the 
typical Takings Clause case, much less the general range of constitu-
tional rights cases. The usual Takings Clause dispute does not in-
volve this sort of bargaining between a property owner and the gov-
ernment, but rather the blunt exercise of power by the state to regu-
late the property without regard to the desires of the property owner. 
Even in the limited context of Takings Clause cases, therefore, ex-
amples of bargaining are relatively rare, they have very different fac-
tual backgrounds than other sorts of constitutional disputes, prop-
erty rights are not that strong to begin with, and the parties in prop-
erty rights cases are often in a much stronger position vis-à-vis the 
government than rights holders in other types of disputes. In short, 
there is very little reason to believe that the model of rights bargain-
ing that the courts permit in a relatively rare and conceptually dis-
                                                                                                                      
 78. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374. 
 79. Farber, supra note 1, at 948. 
 80. Id. at 947. 
 81. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text. 
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tinctive set of property rights cases can or should be extended to the 
more typical sorts of constitutional cases. 
D.   State Sovereignty and “States’ Rights” 
 The first area cited by Farber as evidence of rights bargaining is 
the area of so-called states’ rights.82 This area is easy to dispense with 
because in fact these cases involve neither rights nor bargaining.  
 There is an abundance of literature explaining the multiple prob-
lems inherent in the cases Farber discusses in the part of his article 
dealing with state sovereignty.83 The important point for present 
purposes, however, is that these cases do not belong in a discussion 
of bargaining and individual rights because the state sovereignty 
cases do not involve rights at all. The term “states’ rights” is a mis-
nomer. These are federalism cases, which pertain to competing 
claims to government authority, not cases about rights. They are 
cases allocating (and arguably misallocating) political authority be-
tween two or more competing political entities. Nothing in the Su-
preme Court’s Tenth or Eleventh Amendment cases bears any re-
semblance to the sorts of individual rights at issue in the other areas 
discussed by Farber. The other areas all involve some aspect of con-
stitutional protection for individuals against the collective decisions 
of a hostile political majority. The federalism cases, on the other 
hand, have the effect of taking political power from one politically 
powerful entity and allocating it to another politically powerful en-
tity. In this context, it makes little sense to talk of rights, except in 
the sense that an individual or collective entity that is allocated com-
plete power over a certain area has the “right” to do whatever that 
entity wants, free of external control. 
                                                                                                                      
 82. Farber, supra note 1, at 918-20.   
 83. Heavy criticism has been leveled at both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment 
manifestations of the state sovereignty concept. The criticism of the Tenth Amendment 
version of the concept of state sovereignty has focused on the conceptual and practical dif-
ficulties of insulating the states from federal mandates and the weak historical record sup-
porting judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment against the federal government. For 
a critique that includes each of these points, see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and 
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995). The criticism of the Eleventh Amendment version of the state 
sovereignty concept tends to focus on both the practical problems of immunizing the state, 
see Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2001) 
(arguing that Eleventh Amendment immunity is inconsistent with the structure of consti-
tutional constraints on government), as well as the historical inaccuracy of the Court’s jus-
tifications for expanding the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, see William A. 
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of 
an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court misread the purpose of the 
Eleventh Amendment). 
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 In any event, even if it were accurate to call the authority the Su-
preme Court allocates to subordinate political entities “rights,” there 
is nothing in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence to sug-
gest that any of the relevant parties bargain over the allocation of po-
litical authority. In fact, the absence of bargaining underscores both 
the practical and theoretical problems with the Court’s federalism 
cases. The practical problem is that once the Court has prohibited 
the federal government from enacting or enforcing a particular fed-
eral policy, there is no flexibility built into the system; the states 
have complete authority to refuse assistance in enforcing the federal 
policy. The theoretical problem with this system is that these cases 
literally (and illogically84) give states a form of limited sovereignty. 
Once something falls under the scope of this grant of state sover-
eignty, the federal government is completely disempowered. It is an 
all-or-nothing system, and the federal government has no bargaining 
power over the control of areas that the Supreme Court has recently 
decided to classify as an aspect of state sovereignty.  
 These conclusions can be illustrated by cases in both the Court’s 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment state sovereignty jurisprudence. In 
the Court’s early rendition of the Tenth Amendment version of state 
sovereignty, the Court identified a formalistic category of protected 
state authority, which the Court labeled “traditional governmental 
functions.”85 Once a subject fell within this category, the federal gov-
ernment was completely without power to act, and all authority de-
volved to the states. This category proved unworkable and was aban-
doned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.86 In 
the more recent renditions of Tenth Amendment state sovereignty 
decisions, the Court has abandoned the effort to identify entire cate-
gories of protected state power, but it has identified and prohibited 
certain mechanisms of making and enforcing public policy at the na-
tional level. In New York v. United States,87 for example, the Court 
held that the federal government had no authority to “commandeer” 
the state legislative process to force the state to carry out policies 
adopted by the federal government.88 Similarly, in Printz v. United 
States,89 the Court held that the federal government could not re-
quire state and local officials to carry out a federal policy over which 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 (2002) 
(arguing that “state sovereignty,” as defined and applied by the Supreme Court in its cur-
rent Tenth and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, is inconsistent with the concept of 
sovereignty). 
 85. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
 86. 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985) (overturning National League of Cities and the tradi-
tional governmental functions test). 
 87. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 88. Id. at 175.  
 89. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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the state and local officials had no say in creating.90 Other ancillary 
rules dictate how the federal government must articulate a policy in 
order to make that policy applicable to the states.91  
 The Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is to the same ef-
fect: the sovereign authority granted to states is complete and not 
subject to bargaining. The rules are by now very clear. For example, 
states may not be sued directly for damages or other monetary relief 
that serves the same function as damages.92 Congress may not abro-
gate these protections in a statute passed under the Commerce 
Clause.93 The federal government may not even force the state courts 
to consider actions involving claims that the states have violated fed-
eral law.94 In short, the state’s sovereignty—or the state’s “right”—is 
absolute and not subject to bargaining. Of course, the state may sim-
ply decide not to exercise its sovereign authority by waiving that au-
thority and agreeing to be sued in federal court,95 but that is true of 
every right, and has nothing to do with bargaining.  
 In short, to the extent that the state sovereignty cases even belong 
in a discussion of constitutional rights, they actually disprove the 
thesis that all rights are subject to being bargained away by a willing 
rights holder. 
IV.   THE STRUCTURAL FUNCTION OF RIGHTS AND THE CASE AGAINST 
ALIENABILITY 
 As indicated above, most of the cases cited by Farber do not in-
deed support the rights bargaining thesis. Contrary to Farber’s cen-
tral thesis, rights are not generally subject to being bought and sold. 
The question remains whether this is a good thing. Markets are quite 
the rage at the moment. Markets are, by current popular acclaim, 
capable of doing a much better job of ascertaining value than the dis-
torted subjective perceptions of inherent value that dominate old-
fashioned rights talk. In the crass parlance of the modern view, 
“value” is reduced to whatever people are willing to pay for a particu-
                                                                                                                      
 90. Id. at 935 (holding that the federal government may not “conscript the State’s offi-
cers” in order to compel states to enforce a federal program). 
 91. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (requiring a plain statement by 
Congress in federal statutes that apply to important state functions). 
 92. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 93. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 94. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 95. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (holding that 
a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, so long as it provides “an unequivo-
cal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would 
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment”). 
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lar resource in a voluntary exchange in an open market.96 In a cul-
ture now permeated by market fetishism, it is quite natural to ask 
whether, if markets are so efficient in determining value in other ar-
eas, why not let them also mediate the relationship between the gov-
ernment and its citizens? It may be that if rights were subject to bar-
gaining, we would find that in most situations we really do not value 
rights as much as popular rights mythology suggests.  
 There are many reasons to reject a bargaining approach to rights 
and reassert the traditional view that many rights are unconditional 
and nonwaivable. Four reasons are especially compelling. First, 
rights bargaining should be rejected because bargaining ignores the 
structural function that rights serve. Second, bargaining over rights 
will always take place between parties who do not have the normal 
role or relationship of parties in a traditional bargain over private 
goods and services. In a normal bargain, it is often possible to 
achieve a result that leaves both parties in a position that they will 
view as an improvement over what came before. In a bargain over 
rights, however, only the government will ever be in a position to 
logically conclude that it is better off with the bargain than without 
it. Third, it is a natural function of the nontraditional relationship 
between parties bargaining over rights that the parties will always 
operate in an atmosphere characterized by unequal bargaining 
power. Fourth, bargains concerning rights will never be efficient in 
the sense that is ascribed to bargains over private goods because 
bargains over social goods, such as rights, will always be plagued 
with problems of valuation and comprehensiveness. 
A.   The Structural Function of Rights 
 The first reason courts should not allow citizens to bargain away 
rights is that the rights bargaining theory devalues the extent to 
which individual rights serve a broader structural function in society. 
In addition to protecting individual claimants, rights provide struc-
tural limits on the exercise of political authority by government in 
general. An individual possessor of a right is allowed to exercise that 
right not only on his or her own behalf, but also on behalf of everyone 
else in society. When an individual exercises some constitutional 
right, that person also acts as a representative of the entire society 
by enforcing the Constitution’s structural constraints on government 
action that potentially could affect all individuals. The structure of 
individual rights serves as a comprehensive check on the abuse of 
governmental power and protects the most salient features of democ-
                                                                                                                      
 96. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (6th ed. 2003) (describ-
ing the advantages of economic markets in which “resources are shifted to those uses in 
which the value to consumers, as measured by their willingness to pay, is highest”). 
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ratic governance. Limitations on governmental intrusion into indi-
vidual freedom are essential to protect a system in which citizens 
control the government and not vice versa. A government that can 
control individual behavior and bargain away its own structural con-
straints is also a government that can essentially generate its own 
political consent by buying off dissenters and antagonists, to the se-
rious detriment of others in society who are not part of the bargain. 
 The routine exercise of rights creates a social atmosphere in which 
citizens approach their relationship with the government from the 
perspective that most personal thought, expression, and behavior are 
insulated from collective control. This is why the courts permit facial 
overbreadth challenges to statutes in the context of First Amend-
ment and privacy contexts.97 Thus, in the First Amendment context, 
litigants “are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own 
rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial predic-
tion or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others 
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech 
or expression.”98 Viewing rights as mere default rules that can be 
bargained away by individual possessors of those rights is deeply 
problematic because if one person is permitted to bargain away his or 
her rights, that bargain weakens the structural impediments of gov-
ernment power generally in a way that undermines the most basic 
function of those rights for those who are not parties to the bargain. 
In an important sense, any negotiation over rights between a rights 
holder and the government is inherently flawed because the negotia-
tion will exclude many of the relevant parties: for example, other 
citizens who might be inclined to exercise the same right. 
 It is not difficult to conceive of examples of constitutional provi-
sions that are typically enforced as individual rights, but which are 
phrased and/or function primarily as structural provisions. The Es-
tablishment Clause is a prime example of this phenomenon. As it has 
been interpreted and enforced during the last sixty years, the Estab-
lishment Clause provides a comprehensive range of individualized 
protections from government actions that endorse or advance a par-
ticular religion or religion in general. Thus, taxpayers may sue to 
overturn unconstitutional governmental expenditures that benefit 
religious institutions,99 and any affected individual can sue to invali-
date government actions endorsing overtly religious symbols100 or ad-
                                                                                                                      
 97. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) (describing the use of 
overbreadth challenges in First Amendment and privacy cases). 
 98. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
 99. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 100. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a 
Christmas display in a county courthouse that employed explicitly Christian symbols). 
2006]                         CONTRACTING AWAY RIGHTS 977 
 
vancing sectarian ideas.101 Despite the explicitly structural phrasing 
of the Establishment Clause, it provides a mechanism for challenging 
government actions that coerce dissenters to join the religious activi-
ties or beliefs that are endorsed by the majority.102  
 The point of all these decisions giving individuals rights against 
the state is not just to protect the individual litigant, but rather to 
structure society in a way that prohibits the government from 
“mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status 
in the political community.”103 The Establishment Clause is, in other 
words, primarily a structural provision, and the notion that the gov-
ernment can purchase compliance by bargaining with particular in-
dividuals to forgo Establishment Clause protections is anathema to 
the purpose and function of that portion of the First Amendment. 
 A similar case can be made about many areas of First Amendment 
free speech law. The Court has articulated the structural function of 
the Free Speech Clause most clearly in the political patronage cases. 
In those cases the Court has held that a civil servant’s ability to hold 
a government job may not be made contingent on that individual’s 
agreement to join or support the political party currently in control of 
the government (and the government’s jobs).104 If a civil servant’s 
right to be free of political pressure were truly subject to bargaining, 
then these cases would make no sense—and indeed, the principle for 
which they stand would be unenforceable. If the government could 
bargain its way out of a ruling that the government is prohibited 
from bargaining over the political allegiance of civil servants, then 
First Amendment protections of government employees would be 
rendered meaningless. 
 The same can be said, ironically, of the law relating to other 
speech restrictions on government employees—which Farber cites as 
a prime example of the rights bargaining thesis.105 As noted above,106 
                                                                                                                      
 101. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding unconstitutional 
two county-authorized displays of the Ten Commandments). 
 102. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconsti-
tutional officially sanctioned prayer at a public school football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (holding unconstitutional officially sanctioned prayer at a public school 
formal graduation ceremony); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting state-
endorsed prayer in public schools). 
 103. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 104. See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (finding in-
dependent contractor’s ability to work for government cannot be conditioned on support for 
political officials running the government); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 
(1990) (holding that the promotions, transfers, and recalls of government employees cannot 
be conditioned on membership in political party currently controlling government); Branti 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that government employment cannot be conditioned 
on employees joining the political party currently controlling the government); Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (same). 
 105. See Farber, supra note 1, at 920-23. 
 106. See supra notes 27-58 and accompanying text. 
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the government may condition public employment on the employee 
doing his or her job in a way that does not disrupt the workplace.107 
But the government may not bargain away that employee’s right to 
speak on matters of public concern,108 nor may the government put 
any restrictions whatsoever on public employees whose job function 
requires them to be independent of—and sometimes even antagonis-
tic to—the government.109  
 Much the same case can be made about almost every aspect of the 
Constitution. While the Constitution protects individual rights, it 
also structures the relations between all citizens and the govern-
ment. Whatever theoretical sense it may make to permit individuals 
to bargain away rights that operate to their—and only their—benefit 
(and I argue below that bargaining makes no sense in that context, 
either), bargaining is entirely inconsistent with the notion that the 
government is structurally prohibited from ever engaging in certain 
types of behavior or lacks power altogether to engage in certain ac-
tivities.110 The government will always be much richer than any of 
the people it governs, so permitting the government to purchase 
more constitutional authority than it otherwise would possess 
amounts to an argument for the removal of any effective constraint 
on the exercise of political power. 
B.   The Dysfunctional Antagonism of Rights Bargainers 
 Even if the structural function of rights is ignored and rights are 
treated as solely the individual concern of individual rights holders, 
there are basic problems with the rights bargaining thesis. One of 
the problems with applying contractual default rules to bargaining 
over constitutional rights is that the relationship between the parties 
                                                                                                                      
 107. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (permitting government employers to 
restrict employee speech that disrupts the workplace). 
 108. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[S]tatements by public offi-
cials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite 
the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors.”).  
 109. See Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding unconstitutional 
government limits on the speech of government-financed attorneys whose professional role 
required them to take positions antagonistic to the government). 
 110. The criticisms here are leveled against Farber’s use of economic models to permit 
individuals to bargain away rights that are defined outside the market context. Note that 
this is not the only use of the economics model to critique the dominant construct of inal-
ienable rights. Another problematic use of economic models of rights applies market-
oriented theories to define the rights themselves. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Cost of 
Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and for the United States, 32 TULSA 
L.J. 1 (1996) (arguing that a cost-benefit approach should be applied to the definition of 
rights, just as to the management of all other scarce social resources). A full critique of this 
system-level application of the economic model to rights must await another forum, but it 
should be noted that some of the problems raised by Farber’s rights bargaining model—
such as the problems of valuation and comprehensiveness, see infra notes 111-14 and ac-
companying text—also are evident in the Posnerian model as well. 
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in disputes over constitutional violations is fundamentally different 
than the relationship of parties in contractual disputes. To put the 
point colloquially, in normal negotiations over contractual terms the 
parties are—or want to be—friends. Each party to the contract seeks 
something from the other, but they seek to advance their individual 
interests through a mutually advantageous bargain in which (if eve-
rything goes according to plan) both parties will come out ahead. If 
the bargain is successful, the result will be a healthy economic sym-
biosis because assets will be distributed in a more efficient fashion. 
Thus, the sum of satisfactions after the bargain is greater than the 
sum of satisfactions in the absence of the bargain.  
 In disputes over the application of constitutional rights, on the 
other hand, the parties are almost by definition enemies. In a free 
speech dispute, the radical speaker wants to talk, and the government 
wants to silence him. In an Establishment Clause dispute over gov-
ernment-sponsored religion in public schools, the religious dissenter 
wants to attend school without being subjected to a religious exercise, 
whereas the government wants to impose the religious views on the 
dissenter. In a Fourth Amendment dispute, the criminal wants to keep 
all indications of his criminal activity private, while the state wants to 
rifle through the most personal aspects of the criminal’s life for in-
criminating evidence. In an abortion dispute, a woman wants an abor-
tion, while the government wants a new baby. In none of these situa-
tions is there the same possibility of a symbiotic relationship as there 
is in the typical private contractual situation. Assuming that the 
rights holder is permitted to bargain away the right, only the govern-
ment will get what it really wants. The best the rights holder can ex-
pect to take away from the bargain is a consolation prize for giving up 
the very thing that the rights holder really wants.  
 In this atmosphere, no matter how much the relationship between 
the parties looks like an ordinary bargain, that relationship is really 
irredeemably dysfunctional. The rights holder literally will never win 
unless the rights holder decides at the end of the process to forgo the 
bargain altogether. 
C.   The Unequal Bargaining Power of Rights Bargainers 
 The problem of unequal bargaining power is related to the gener-
ally dysfunctional nature of the relationship between a rights holder 
and a government during a negotiation over the exercise of rights. An 
indisputable fact of life in these situations is that the government 
has more power than any rights holder with whom it is bargaining. It 
also has access to sanctions that go far beyond anything that can be 
applied by private parties. Thus, to put the matter in the worst pos-
sible light, if the government wants to undermine a certain category 
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of constitutional rights, it can offer outsized incentives (or threaten 
similarly outsized sanctions) to buy off (or intimidate) the few rights 
holders that insist on attempting to exercise that right. If the gov-
ernment is conscientious about pursuing this approach, it can effec-
tively ensure that the right will never be exercised.  
 The disparity in power among bargaining parties is important be-
cause in a negotiation over the exercise of constitutional rights, the 
parties do not have the same incentives to reach a mutually benefi-
cial bargain that they do in the private contractual context. In the 
constitutional rights context, the only reason anyone would bargain 
with the government to give up their rights is because they feel that 
they have no choice (or did not really care about exercising the right 
in the first place). The government, on the other hand, never will 
have to bargain, in the private law sense, because the individual citi-
zen will never have anything the government really wants. No pri-
vate party will ever be powerful enough to, for example, force the 
government to provide more Fourth Amendment rights than the 
Constitution mandates. The ratchet in a rights bargaining scenario 
will only work in one direction. The reason the contractual model will 
never be a good fit in analyzing constitutional issues is because the 
rights bargaining process will never produce a true bargain in the 
private contractual sense. The bargain will always favor the govern-
ment, whose position in the process will always be “take it or leave 
it.” The rights holder has few options if the government’s bargain is 
not satisfactory. A private party can always go to the vendor down 
the street to try for a better deal; the rights holder does not have a 
similar power to leave the bargaining table and make a better deal 
with another government. 
D.   The Insurmountable Problems of Valuation and 
Comprehensiveness 
 The final reason why the contractual model should not be applied to 
the analysis of constitutional rights has to do with the problem of valua-
tion. All prescriptive economic modeling is plagued with problems of 
valuation and comprehensiveness. Effective bargaining requires parties 
to assess both the present impact and future value of their deal; exter-
nalities have to be identified and assessed; relative values have to be as-
signed to often nonfungible goods, services, or interests; and contingen-
cies have to be calculated. These problems are troubling even in ordi-
nary commercial bargaining, where apples are often swapped for or-
anges. The problems are exponentially more daunting in bargaining 
over rights, where apples are being traded for elephants.  
 In light of these inherent difficulties, it is highly doubtful that 
parties bargaining over rights will ever be able to arrive at a satisfac-
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tory (that is, an objectively defensible) decision regarding the proper 
value to assign to the rights being bargained away. It is equally 
doubtful that two parties will be able to adequately take into account 
the relevant externalities of a decision to forgo a right. Additionally, 
if there is any validity to the argument made above about the struc-
tural function of rights,111 then the valuation problems with rights 
bargaining probably become insurmountable. Neither party in the 
rights-bargaining scenario has an incentive to introduce into the 
valuation calculus the value of the structural function of the right in 
question. The rights holder has no incentive to take into considera-
tion the structural value of the right in question because he or she is 
exclusively concerned with trying to resolve an immediate problem 
stemming from an encounter with an aggressive and antagonistic 
government; in such circumstances the long-term consequences for 
society as a whole are unlikely to attract much of the rights holder’s 
attention. Likewise, the government actually has an incentive to ig-
nore altogether considerations relating to the structural functions of 
rights because the government’s position will typically reflect its 
natural inclination to maximize its own power.  
 Even if the natural flaws in the bargaining process were not pre-
sent, it would not be difficult to discern the problem of valuing rights 
when moving from the arena of private contract law to public law in-
volving rights. The category of private law is characterized by bar-
gaining for immediate gain relating to the exchange of tangible goods 
or identifiable services. The realm of public bargains over rights, on 
the other hand, has the essentially unquantifiable consequences of 
establishing the parameters for the government’s exercise of political 
power over all society. For a representative example of the problem, 
one need not go beyond the First Amendment. What is the collective 
value of free speech, after all? Or the general rule against prior re-
straints?112 The executives of The New York Times may be able to as-
sign a value to its right to publish the Pentagon Papers,113 at least 
insofar as they could calculate the number of extra papers they could 
sell and balance that against the cost to defend the lawsuit seeking 
the right to publish; but how is that calculation going to factor in the 
value (political and otherwise) of society’s access to irreplaceable in-
formation about its government’s duplicity and incompetence? And 
do we really want to assume that this value can be set in a series of 
isolated bargains between the government and citizens who will vir-
tually always be at a natural disadvantage vis-à-vis the government 
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 112. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (extending the First Amendment pro-
hibition of prior restraints to cover limits on speech embodied in injunctions). 
 113. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down an injunction 
prohibiting The New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers).  
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when they sit down at the bargaining table? Should the value of col-
lective rights be set by a series of bargains undertaken between a 
three hundred-pound guerrilla and a gnat?  
 Maybe, as Richard Posner has suggested,114 all societies inevitably 
engage in an economic cost-benefit analysis when determining the na-
ture and magnitude of rights that they grant to their citizens. Even if 
this is an accurate description of the social and political process that 
produces legal instruments like the U.S. Constitution, at least this 
scenario envisions that the bargaining will be done on the collective 
level, with a focus on the broader social consequences of the bargain 
throughout society over a long period of time. The rights bargaining 
envisioned by Farber does not incorporate the broader scope of a Pos-
nerian macrobargain among the complete range of interested parties 
in society. Instead, it envisions a series of microbargains between the 
government and individual adversaries, the cumulation of which will 
have collective consequences that will far exceed anything that is 
taken into account by the relevant players. This is not the proper way 
to fashion the rules governing a proper constitutional democracy. In 
short, therefore, Farber’s general endorsement of rights bargaining 
should be rejected because it involves unequal bargains between play-
ers who will inevitably fail to take into account the value of things that 
probably cannot accurately be valued anyway.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 It is very tempting to resolve the many problems with the concept 
of unconstitutional conditions by abandoning the concept in favor of a 
malleable system in which rights are constantly reconfigured to suit 
the immediate needs of the parties to a particular conflict between 
the government and a single, identifiable rights holder. Treating 
rights as similar to the default rules in the system of private contract 
law at least would have the advantage of explaining why the courts 
often both assert the existence of rights and simultaneously refuse to 
enforce them. In the end, however, the attractions of the rights bar-
gaining theory are far outweighed by the theory’s single glaring flaw. 
Treating a constitutional right as a private contract has the effect of 
undermining the role of constitutional rights in the social contract, 
and in a society in which claims of unfettered governmental power 
over individuals are asserted with increasing stridency and fre-
quency, the social contract is probably worth preserving no matter 
how sweet a deal the government offers to buy its way out of it. 
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